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BOUT THIRTY YEARS AGO, in the 1980s, the German film director 
Phillip Gröning spent a week in a Carthusian monastery. This was 
an unusual opportunity, because Carthusian monasteries are no ordinary 
places. For nearly 1,000 years the monks who inhabit them have lived in 
the detachment of an almost unbroken silence. No visitors are allowed 
to enter the monastery, no artificial devices are allowed to distract the 
attention of the hermits. Spending their time in meditation, prayer and 
manual labour, Carthusians only leave their cells for the daily Eucharist 
and three prayer services in the monastery chapel, where they congregate 
in silence. Only on Sundays do they talk with each other and take a 
walk together.  
A few years after this visit, in 1984, Gröning asked the prior of the 
community for permission to make a documentary film about his monastery. 
The prior promised that he would think about this request, and talk 
about it with his fellow monks. In the year 2000, sixteen years after this 
conversation, Gröning received an unexpected phone call. The prior was 
at the other end of the line and he said: ‘yes’.  
Gröning was allowed to enter La Grande Chartreuse, mother house 
of the Carthusian order, which is located in the Chartreuse mountains 
north of Grenoble. But he had to come alone, equipped only with a 
hand-held camera, and he had to promise that he would not use any 
additions: no soundtrack, no narration and no artificial light. Only natural 
noises and the chants of the monks were permitted to break the silence.  
Gröning spent almost six months with the hermits, and it took him 
five years to edit the footage. When his film finally appeared it enjoyed 
considerable popularity in France, Italy, Spain, Germany and Japan. 
A 
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Gröning’s documentary does not include any story, nor does it draw 
out emotions. Hence, it might be thought that it has nothing to offer and 
nothing to say. But it captures what we have lost under the dictatorship 
of modern technology: time. And it makes audible what we no longer 
hear: the silent voice of the present time. 
At the beginning of the film, an intertitle relates the story of Elijah’s 
return to Mount Horeb. Several centuries after Moses had encountered 
the Lord for the first time at this place, Elijah returned to Mount Horeb 
in order to complain about the faithlessness of the Israelites. It seemed 
to him as if they had forgotten the Name of God. But on his way back to 
the place of Moses’ first encounter with the Lord, Elijah also became 
forgetful: he no longer recalled why he felt the desire to return. When 
he finally arrived, he hid himself in a cave. But the word of God came 
to him saying: 
Go out and stand on the mountain before the Lord, for the Lord is 
about to pass by. Now there was a great wind, so strong that it was 
splitting mountains and breaking rocks in pieces before the Lord, but 
the Lord was not in the wind; and after the wind an earthquake, but the 
Lord was not in the earthquake; and after the earthquake a fire, but 
the Lord was not in the fire; and after the fire a sound of sheer 
silence. When Elijah heard it, he wrapped his face in his mantle and 
went out and stood at the entrance of the cave. (1 Kings 19:11–13)  
 
A still from Into Great Silence 
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We might call this experience of forgetfulness a religious experience 
of a kind. But it is not only of religious significance. It shares its most 
significant features with a key philosophical problem of our modern 
world: the ‘forgetfulness of being’. As philosophers who are familiar with 
the continental tradition know, the modern ‘forgetfulness of being’ was 
first thematized by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, shortly 
after the First World War.  
According to Heidegger, we are not autonomous subjects that relate 
to empirical facts in the world ‘out there’. Our scientific, artistic, ethical, 
political or philosophical attempts to make sense of the world are 
always modes of caring for the world that we inhabit. Consequently, our 
reasoning about the world is always governed by preconceptions about 
its meaning; we are always already ‘situated’ in the world to which we 
relate. However, we can become forgetful of the point of our ‘being-there’ 
(Dasein). We may still be perfectly fitted to do what we are expected to 
do in the hamster-wheel of our everyday business; we may even be able to 
provide a sophisticated account of the ultimate meaning and purpose of 
our hamster-wheel that is consistent with the common beliefs of the people, 
the collective reasoning of the philosophical or scientific community, or 
the ecclesial teaching of the Christian tradition. But our sophisticated 
reasoning no longer relates to our being-there, here and now.  
In states such as angst or boredom, we may then discover that 
everything ‘slips away’, that no matter matters any longer; and this 
experience is, according to Heidegger, more than a fleeting subjective mood. 
It reveals something about the ‘fundamental attunement of being 
situated’ (Grundbefindlichkeit).1 If we are aware of this basic attunement, 
we start to understand why our access to the ‘being’ of the world is not 
self-evident, and why the scientific systems, opinions and narratives that 
shape our everyday attempts to make sense of the world can lose their 
reliability, both on the private and on the collective (political, scientific, 
cultural or ecclesial) level. If this happens to be the case, we may discover 
that we are lost in our hamster-wheel—and we are now prepared to 
realise that there is no hope of changing this fate by speeding up our 
activity or inventing new ideas about the overall purpose of the wheel. 
According to Heidegger, this is one of the most characteristic features 
of our modern world: we have become forgetful of the simplest thing in 
 
 
1 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, translated by Joan Stambaugh 
(Albany: SUNY, 1996), nn. 29–30, 40. 
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our life, our ability to be. How can human beings forget to be present 
in the world that they inhabit and enact? We are inclined to become 
forgetful of our ability to be present because it is frightening—as 
Heidegger realised when he considered existential basic experiences such 
as boredom and angst as key to recovering the foundations of philosophical 
considerations about the concept of being. Elijah was about to realise 
something similar when he hid himself in a cave. He no longer knew 
what it is like to face God’s presence, and this forgetfulness was frightening.  
Now it is worth recalling the place where Elijah’s forgetfulness 
happened: the mountain where his forefather Moses had encountered 
the Lord for the first time. Already in this first encounter, the Lord had 
provided a quite philosophical response to the question of forgetfulness. 
He recalled the concept of being in telling Moses how he might recollect 
the name of the Lord. At Mount Horeb, Moses had asked God the 
following question:  
If I come to the Israelites and say to them, ‘The God of your ancestors 
has sent me to you’, and they ask me, ‘What is his name?’ what shall I 
say to them?’ God said to Moses, ‘I AM WHO I AM’. (Exodus 3:12–14) 
More than 2,000 years later, Thomas Aquinas provided the most concise 
philosophical summary of this response to the question of forgetfulness: 
God is not an ‘entity’—God is being itself.2  
Heidegger was not interested in the forgetfulness of God. As a 
philosopher, he confined his research to the forgetfulness of being. But 
the modern forgetfulness of being has much in common with the older 
problem of the forgetfulness of God. In both cases our forgetfulness is 
related to a kind of anxiety—the inclination to hide in caves instead of 
facing the present time.  
In his early writings, Heidegger used an everyday example to illustrate 
this phenomenon: the example of mortality. Every one of us knows that 
we are mortal ‘beings’ that will sooner or later die. But do we really believe 
that? Do we really know what that means—what it means to be ‘no 
more’? Many people discover only in the last hours of their life what it 
means to be mortal. Death is not a possibility that we can imagine or 
hypothetically anticipate. It is a paradoxical possibility: namely the 
possibility that nothing is any longer possible. ‘Death is the possibility 
 
 
2 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 8 a. 1. 
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The actuality 
of ‘beings’ 
makes us act 
of the absolute impossibility of Da-sein.’ 3 This is the reason why we are 
inclined to evade this possibility. But if we fail to face up to what we 
are—mortal beings—we exist only in an improper or inauthentic sense, 
we are no longer one with ourselves. Our familiarity with the world 
fades away; we do longer understand what it means ‘to be’. 
In my own research, I tried to go one step further in that I focused 
not on Heidegger’s ‘forgetfulness of being’, but on the forgetfulness of 
the act of being. What is the difference? The focus on the act of 
being reminds us that the actuality of being becomes manifest 
only through our ability to act. Already Thomas Aquinas 
noticed a mysterious connection between the words ‘actuality’ 
and ‘action’.4 The actuality of ‘beings’ makes us act. As contemporary 
psychologists put it, the presence of things ‘affords’ 5 actions —it enables 
us to act in body, mind and spirit.  
Aquinas was also already familiar with the metaphysical reason for 
this phenomenon. According to his teaching on the ‘transcendentals’ 
(the ‘trans-generic’ predicates that characterize every creature in so far as 
it participates in the ‘being’ of its creator), being is not a kind of neutral 
facticity. The actuality of ‘being’ (ens) coincides with ‘the true’ (verum) 
and ‘the good’ (bonum) that reveals itself through ‘the beautiful’ (pulchrum) 
in creation wherever it is one (unum) with itself. The ‘brilliance’ (claritas)6 
of everything that is truly one with itself attracts our attention and 
actualises itself in responsive actions—like the beauty of a virtuous 
person, that reveals itself in responses of wonder and praise.  
If the actuality of ‘being’ (ens) coincides with the one, the true and 
the good that reveals itself through the beauty of the world, then being 
is never neutral. The beautiful and good never leaves us untouched or 
indifferent. It is ‘erotically attractive’, in the Platonic sense of this 
expression—its glory attracts our attention and makes us act through 
its mere presence, its mere actuality.  
However, in order to be attentive to the erotic power of the act of 
being, we have to adopt a contemplative attitude: we have to contemplate 
 
 
3 Heidegger, Being and Time, n. 50. 
4 See David B. Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action (Scranton: U. of Scranton P, 2008), chapter 9. 
5 See K. S. Jones, ‘What is an Affordance?’ Ecological Psychology, 15/2 (2003), 107–114, and the other 
articles in this special issue. 
6 As for the subtle relationship between Aquinas’ concept of beauty (pulchrum) to the (more proper) 
transcendentals of unum, verum and bonum, see Oleg V. Bychkov, ‘Metaphysics as Aesthetics: Aquinas’ 
Metaphysics in Present-Day Theological Aesthetics’, Modern Theology, 31 (2015), 147–178. 
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the silent presence of the actual world, without being distracted by chatty 
speculations about possible worlds, without concerns about what ‘might 
have happened’ in the past, and without worrying about future possibilities. 
Consequently, a truly realistic philosophy has to have a contemplative core. 
The fullness of ‘being’ reveals its actuality principally in a contemplative 
science, the science of prayer, where ‘to be silent is to speak’ (as Nicholas 
of Cusa put it in the fifteenth century).7 
The first significant steps in the philosophical movements that made 
us forgetful of this contemplative core of our theoretical reasoning about 
the ‘being’ of the world were taken a generation after Thomas Aquinas, 
in the Franciscan tradition of the late Middle Ages.8 But this was only 
the start of a long-term development that reached its turning point in the 
world-pictures of the founders of modern science and philosophy, Galileo 
Galilei, René Descartes, John Locke and Isaac Newton. In the age of 
Galileo and Newton it was still possible to relate the articulation of 
scientific theories to spiritual practices. But this was no longer the main 
concern of the innovators of this time. Hence, Descartes’ Meditations of 
1641 marked a kind of threshold—the transition point between the 
premodern concept of theoria, which built on practices of contemplation, and 
the modern concept of science, which builds on practices of manipulation.  
According to the modern concept of science, our ability to develop a 
scientific ‘theory’ does not require us to cultivate a tradition of ethical 
habits, narratives and contemplative practices. We can confine ourselves 
to constructing possible worlds that can be expressed in the quantifiable 
language of mathematical logic and tested through empirical observation. In 
order to assure that such hypothetical constructions are realistic in scientific 
terms, it suffices to make sure that the related empirical observations 
can be mechanically repeated, independently of the circumstances of 
their discovery—as we do when we test scientific theories in laboratories 
that enable us to control what might and might not happen. Already in 
1644, Descartes summarised this new concept of scientific theorizing 
in the following words: ‘I have described this Earth, and indeed the 
whole visible universe, as if it were a machine’.9  
 
 
7 Nicholas of Cusa, De dato patris lumini, c. 3 n. 107, 9. 
8 For a critical discussion of this genealogy see Johannes Hoff, ‘The Analogical Turn: Responses to John 
Betz, Michael E. Moore, Matthew Moser, and Daniel O’Connell, Virtual Symposium on Johannes Hoff: 
The Analogical Turn’, Syndicate Theology (2015), available at https://syndicatetheology.com/symposium/871/. 
9 René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, translated by John Cottingham, part 4, n. 188, in The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, volume 1 (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 279. 
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In a certain sense, this summary became the charter for the modern 
‘age of the world-picture’:10 from this point on the world appeared as 
configuration of neutral facts that operated, like a well-constructed machine, 
in accordance with a predictable, fixed and invariable (algorithmic) ‘picture’ 
of its rules. Hence, we became used to the modern fiction that the world 
is a kind of clockwork that operates without any spontaneity or creativity.  
Under the influence of this clockwork imagery, theist philosophers 
and theologians concluded that God has to be a kind of watchmaker. 
God was no longer conceived as the silent voice of our present time 
that calls us to get out of our caves—or at least not from an educated, 
scientific point of view. Rather, God appeared as a kind of engineer: a 
remote builder of a gigantic mechanism, or an intelligent designer who 
triggered the evolution of human life billions of years ago. We are still 
trapped in this imagery when we consider God the initiator of a ‘big bang’, 
or when we say that our behaviour is ‘programmed into our genes’, as if 
God were the first link in a chain of temporal causes, or a gigantic 
anthropomorphic entity that created the world in accordance with a 
predictable algorithmic plan—and not the incomprehensible principle 
of everything that exists (including the secondary principles of temporality, 
causality and human engineering). 
 
 
10 See Martin Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 115–154. 
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We are 
not detached 
observers of 
neutral facts
Already in Descartes, this mechanical cosmology was accompanied by 
a picture of the world in which the human soul adopts the position of an 
external spectator. We cannot describe the world as a mechanism without 
assuming the position of a detached observer, who is able to observe it 
without intervening in its automatic operation. Our physical activities 
might be part of this cosmic clockwork, but the scientific observer has to 
adopt a detached ‘view from nowhere’ in order to draw an unbiased, 
objective picture of the world. But is this really the world that exists? Is 
this way of investigating the world still faithful to what we experience 
as being?  
If we adopt a more realistic point of view, we soon see that the modern 
strategy to construct an algorithmic ‘picture of the world’ was unrealistic 
from the outset. We are not detached observers of neutral facts. Even 
scientists are always part of the world that they observe; we 
are always involved in the world that we perceive, and this 
includes modes of affective, ethical and even spiritual 
involvement. The hand that touches the world can be touched 
as well; the eye that sees the world is itself a visible thing. I 
do not see my eye when I am looking at other people, but I am aware 
that my eye is visible in the same way as the back of a door is visible, 
even though it is not visible for me here and now.  
As the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty has pointed 
out, our ability to see is always accompanied by the awareness that we 
are a bodily part of a sensible field in which objects can be seen, heard, 
touched, smelled and tasted.11 For this reason, perception is always 
interactive. We might stare at objects from the distance, but our view 
is not detached. The object stares back.12 Whatever I see is looking at 
me—it attracts my attention and guides my action. To use the language 
of Thomas Aquinas: whatever actually emerges in my perceptual field 
makes me act.  
This becomes most evident when a human person emerges in my 
perceptual field. The French philosopher and mystic Simone Weil has 
provided us with a concise description of this phenomenon:  
Anybody who is in our vicinity exercises a certain power over us by 
his very presence, and a power that belongs to him alone, that is, the 
 
 
11 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: 
Northwestern UP, 1968), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 1989). 
12 See Georges Didi-Huberman, Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde (Paris: Minuit, 1992). 
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power of halting, repressing, modifying each movement that our body 
sketches out. If we step aside for a passer-by on the road, it is not the 
same thing as stepping aside to avoid a billboard; alone in our rooms, we 
get up, walk about, sit down again quite differently from the way 
we do when we have a visitor.13  
The things in my world have the power to make me act and respond to 
their presence. Even stones and trees have the power to make me 
responsive—they speak to me with a silent voice. When I see a mug, it 
invites me to grasp it. When I see a paved avenue it invites me to walk 
along between the trees.  
Descartes’ mechanical view of the world built on the assumption 
that we have to suppress our involvement with the world in order to be 
realistic observers. But this assumption was neither realistic, nor was it 
based on scientific evidence. It was a pragmatic fiction. Our ability to 
observe is always embedded in our active engagement with what we observe. 
As long as we exist, we participate as thoughtful, animated and acting 
bodies in an animated world—as it was still self-evident for medieval 
philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas.14 
The philosophical realists of the past were still aware that our ability 
to theorize about the world is derivative of our ability to respond to the 
world. Since our childhood, we know what the word ‘being’ means, because 
we have learnt to respond to what we perceive. Hans Urs von Balthasar 
exemplified this tacit knowledge by the smile of a mother who looks at 
her child: ‘The mother’s smile is understood by her child, and in this event 
the world of being as a whole lights up behind the world of images’.15  
For the same reason, premodern philosophers such as Thomas 
Aquinas knew that practices of prayer and contemplation are more than 
a private activity. Contemplative practices bring us back to the responsive 
basic attitude of our childhood. They enable us to act in response to the 
world that we inhabit. Against this background it might be argued that 
only the responsive practices of prayer and contemplation can enable us 
to recover again a realistic understanding of our world.  
Leading spiritual teachers of our time, such as the Benedictine monk 
John Main, have argued in this direction by drawing our attention to 
 
 
13 Simone Weil, The Iliad: or, The Poem of Force, in War and The Iliad, translated by Mary McCarthy 
(New York: NYRB Classics, 2005), 7 (my italics). 
14 See also Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Ma: Belknap, 2007), part 1. 
15 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic, volume 2, The Truth of God, translated by Adrian J. Walker 
(San Francisco: Ignatius, 2004), 254. 
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the modern forgetfulness of being from a religious point of view. Like 
Heidegger, Main acknowledged that the ‘speaking silence’ of ‘being’ is 
frightening:  
Many of us spend a great deal of time in inane conversation because 
we are so frightened and feel socially awkward of silent spaces …. 
We fear silence when we are alone as well and so we often live with 
a constant background of radio chat or muzak.16 
The release of Phillip Gröning’s film Into the Great Silence provided 
us with an illuminating example of this. Many people who went to see 
it left the cinema early because it made them feel unsettled and restless. 
Spiritual guides know this phenomenon. The silent presence of a dirty, 
empty floor, the voiceless inertia of a glass of water, the delusively 
noiseless movement of an aeroplane in the sky, or the speechless presence 
of a human face that is not as beautiful and innocent as we would like 
it to be can make us feel disquiet. But this encounter with the actual 
world can also be the first step to a responsive action that reveals the 
meaning of our being in the world—the glory of a finite creation. John 
Main expressed this basic experience of the spiritual traditions of the 
past in the language of our present time when he wrote: 
In meditation we cross the threshold from background noise into 
silence. Silence is necessary if the human spirit is to thrive and to be 
creative. Silence releases a creative response to life, to our environment 
because it gives our spirit room to be. In silence we do not have to 
justify ourselves, apologize or impress anyone. Just be.17 
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16 Silence and the Stillness in Every Season: Daily Readings with John Main, edited by Paul Harris (New 
York: Continuum, 1998), 315 
17 Silence and the Stillness in Every Season, 315.  
